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The court also cites Laufer for the
proposition that, with 130,000 inmates
in Texas, “it cannot be plausibly inferred
that Linthicum [medical director] played
any role in the decisions Haverkamp
challenges
as
unconstitutional.”
She certainly had more to do with
transgender policy as medical director
than Texas Prison Director Estelle had
with a work excuse for J. W. Gamble
after a bale of cotton injured his back in
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
Yet, claims against him were remanded.
According to the court here,
Haverkamp failed to allege: (1) whether
her treating doctor took treatment
decisions to the Committee; (2) whether
the Committee adjudicated a dispute;
or (3) whether the Committee enforced
any decision to her detriment. With
that, the panel apparently got Judge
Dennis’s vote. He wrote in concurrence
“specially,” because the rest of the panel
did not join in his observation that Judge
Tagle should freely allow amendment
on remand and reconsider appointing
counsel in the district court.
For the most part, this debate about
Ex parte Young is a creature of the 5th
Circuit. It recognized Ex parte Young’s
usefulness recently when it struggled
to preserve it for a utility company in
Green Valley Spa Utilities District v.
City of Schaz, 969 F.3d 4670, 471-75 (5th
Cir. 2020) (en banc). Taken together, in
this writer’s view, the arc from Young to
Green Valley in the Fifth Circuit shows
a disposition in favor of vested interests
(from railroads in the Gilded Age, to
landlords, hoteliers, utility companies,
and prisons) and away from the less
powerful (localities, tenants, transients,
and prisoners – especially LGBTQ
ones). Yet, these civil rights plaintiffs
are those least able to protect themselves
without the doctrine.
Haverkamp was represented on
the appeal by Rights Behind Bars
(Washington, DC) and Goldman &
Russell, PC (Bethesda, MD). Public
Citizen Litigation Group, Washington,
DC, appeared as amicus curiae. ■
William J. Rold is a civil rights attorney
in New York City and a former judge. He
previously represented the American Bar
Association on the National Commission
for Correctional Health Care.
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Church Deemed a “Hate Group” by
Southern Poverty Law Center Loses
Its Battle with Amazon.com Over
Exclusion from the AmazonSmile
Program
By Arthur S. Leonard
The AmazonSmile Foundation, a
tax-exempt corporation affiliated with
Amazon.com, declined an application
by Coral Ridge Ministries Media,
a Christian ministry and media
corporation, to participate in the
AmazonSmile program, because the
Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC)
listed Coral Ridge as a “hate group”
on its website, due to Coral Ridge’s
expressed views about homosexuality.
Under the Amazon Smile program,
Amazon customers designate charities
from a list approved by the Foundation
to receive a donation from Amazon of
0.5% of purchases of qualifying goods
and services from the Amazon.com
website. Under the terms of the program,
“hate groups” may not participate, even
if they would otherwise qualify as taxexempt charitable organizations.
On July 28, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 11th Circuit rejected Coral
Ridge’s state law defamation claim
against SPLC for labeling it a “hate
group” and its religious discrimination
claim against Amazon for excluding it
from the Smile program. Circuit Judge
Charles Wilson wrote for the threejudge panel in Coral Ridge Ministries
Media, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2021
WL 3184962.
Senior U.S. District Judge Myron
Thompson had dismissed the lawsuit
on both claims in September 2019,
concluding
that
Coral
Ridge’s
allegations fell short of describing
actionable defamation under Alabama
law, and that the AmazonSmile program
is not a public accommodation covered
by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which forbids discrimination
because of religion. See 406 F. Supp. 3d
1258 (M.D. Ala.). He alternatively found
that allowing Coral Ridge’s claim would

violate Amazon’s First Amendment
rights, and that Coral Ridge’s factual
allegations did not support a claim of
discrimination because of religion.
While agreeing that Thompson
correctly dismissed the case, the threejudge Court of Appeals panel ruled
more narrowly than had Thompson on
both claims.
To win a defamation suit, a plaintiff
must allege that the defendant made a
damaging false statement of fact about
the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is considered
a “public figure,” which Coral Ridge
conceded that it is, the plaintiff has
to show that the false statement was
made with “actual malice” by the
defendant. “Actual malice” is a term
of art in defamation law. It means that
defendant made the false statement
“with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.”
“Coral Ridge did not sufficiently
plead facts that give rise to a reasonable
inference
that
SPLC
‘actually
entertained serious doubts as to the
veracity’ of its hate group definition
and that definition’s application to
Coral Ridge,” wrote Judge Wilson,
“or that SPLC was ‘highly aware’ that
the definition and its application was
‘probably false.’” In this case, Coral
Ridge was quibbling with the definition
of a hate group that SPLC stated on
its website. Since SPLC states its own
definition, however, “it is hard to see
how SPLC’s use of the term would be
misleading,” wrote Judge Wilson.
While conceding that Coral Ridge
rejected homosexuality based on
religious beliefs, the church alleged
that it “has never attacked or maligned
anyone on the basis of engaging
in homosexual conduct,” but even

accepting that allegation as true – which
the court would have to do in ruling on
a motion to dismiss the case as a matter
of law – the court found that Coral
Ridge’s allegation provided no basis
for finding that SPLC intentionally or
recklessly mislabeled the church, so it
upheld Judge Thompson’s dismissal of
this claim.
The discrimination claim against
Amazon is more complicated. For
one thing, it is not clear that Amazon.
com or its affiliate AmazonSmile
Foundation could be considered public
accommodations in their dealings with
applicants to participate in the Smiles
program. While Judge Thompson had
assumed without analysis that these
defendants could be considered “places
of public accommodation,” he found
that the AmazonSmile program “did
not qualify as a ‘service,’ ‘privilege,’
or ‘advantage’ under the statute,” or,
alternatively, that it could violate the
First Amendment for a court to order
Amazon to donate to Coral Ridge.
Avoiding having to rule on the
statutory issue, the court of appeals went
directly to Amazon’s constitutional
defense, which it found to be valid. The
Supreme Court has frequently ruled that
donating money, whether to a charity or
a political cause, is expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment.
That’s the basis, for example, for the
Court’s decision striking down various
campaign finance reforms by Congress,
such as the infamous Citizens United
case. Judge Wilson quoted Harris v.
Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014), a Supreme
Court ruling stating that “no person
in this country may be compelled to
subsidize speech by a third party that he
or she does not wish to support.” The
court found that this ruling “mapped on”
to Amazon’s constitutional argument.
Coral Ridge argued that because
Amazon patrons select the charities to
which 0.5% of their purchases would
be donated, they are the real donors,
treating Amazon as a mere conduit
for their donations. But AmazonSmile
makes clear in its application process
that Amazon exercises judgment
about which charities can participate,
and specifically states that entities
designated as “hate groups” by SPLC

are disqualified. “We have no problem
finding that Amazon engages in
expressive conduct when it decides
which charities to support through the
AmazonSmile program,” wrote the
judge.
The court drew an analogy to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995), that the South Boston Allied
War Veterans Council had a First
Amendment right to exclude the IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston from the St. Patrick’s
Day Parade organized by the Council.
The Supreme Court ruled that the state
could not require the Council to let
GLIB march, as that would be imposing
on the Council a message that they did
not wish to include in their parade.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court had ruled that the Parade was a
public accommodation and GLIB was
entitled to participate, but the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed that ruling
to protect the free speech rights of the
parade’s organizers.
“In the same way that the Council’s
choice of parade units was expressive
conduct,” wrote Judge Wilson, “so too
is Amazon’s choice of what charities
are eligible to receive donations through
AmazonSmile. Applying Title II in the
way Coral Ridge proposes would not
further the statute’s purpose of ‘securing
for all citizens the full enjoyment of
facilities described in the Act which
are open to the general public.’”
Consequently, the court concluded that
Coral Ridge’s proposed interpretation
of Title II “would infringe on Amazon’s
first Amendment Right to engage in
expressive conduct and would not
further Title II’s purpose,” so it affirmed
Judge Thompson’s decision to dismiss
Coral Ridge’s religious discrimination
claim.
Judge Wilson was appointed to the
Court by President Bill Clinton. Joining
his decision were Circuit Judge Britt
Grant, appointed by President Donald
Trump, and Senior Circuit Judge Gerald
Tjoflat, appointed by President Gerald
Ford. Senior District Judge Thompson
was appointed by President Jimmy
Carter. ■

Federal District
Court Blocks
Tennessee
Restroom Signage
Law
By Matthew Goodwin
On July 9, 2021, Judge Aleta A.
Trauger of the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee
issued a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of a law passed by the
Republican-controlled legislature in
that state requiring and regulating signs
outside restrooms of trans-friendly
public and private spaces, including
businesses. Bongo Productions, LLC
v. Lawrence, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128262; 2021 WL 2897301.
In May of 2021, Tennessee enacted
H.B. 1182/S.B. 1224, which amended
the state’s zoning laws and building
code. “The Act,” as it is referred to
throughout the opinion, went into
effect on July 1, 2021 and requires any
“public or private entity or business
that operates a building or facility
open to the general public . . . ” to post
a notice at the entrance to their public
restrooms if they allow a member of
either “biological sex” to use any public
restroom within the building or facility.
In other words, if a business allows
customers to use the restroom consistent
with their gender identity, that business
must notify its customers of this policy
through a posted sign stating as much.
However, not only does the Act
require that a notice be posted, it
also mandates certain language as
well as what Judge Trauger termed
“ . . . a red-and-yellow, warningsign color scheme, as if to say, Look
Out: Dangerous Gender Expressions
Ahead.” The required notice must
read in boldface, block letters:
“THIS FACILITY MAINTAINS
A POLICY OF ALLOWING THE
USE OF RESTROOMS BY EITHER
BIOLOGICAL SEX, REGARDLESS
OF THE DESIGNATION ON THE
RESTROOM.”
August 2021 LGBT Law Notes 13

